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The majority of papers analyzing the employment effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit
durations focuses on the duration of the first unemployment spell. In this paper, we make two contributions.
First, we use a regression discontinuity design to analyze the long-term effects of extensions in UI
durations. These estimates differ from standard estimates that they incorporate differences in UI benefit
receipt and employment due to recurrent unemployment spells. Second, we derive a welfare formula
of UI extensions that incorporates recurrent nonemployment spells. We find that accounting for nonemployment
beyond the initial spell leads to a significant reduction in estimates of the nonemployment effect of
UI extensions by about 25 percent. We show this effect is only partly explained by a mechanical effect
due to finite follow-up durations, and mainly arises from a lower probability of days in nonemployment
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The eect of extending the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benets on nonem-
ployment duration is a hotly debated question. The vast majority of the literature (e.g., Katz
and Meyer 1990, Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 2012) [henceforth SVB]) analyzes the
eect of extensions in UI durations or increases in UI benets on the initial nonemployment
spell. This may lead to an understatement of the cost of UI extensions, if such extensions
increase the incidence of nonemployment beyond the initial spell, as would be predicted by
models of stigma, skill depreciation, or supply-side hysteresis (e.g., Blanchard and Diamond
1994, Lemieux and MacLeod 2000). On the other hand, these estimates may overstate em-
ployment eects if longer initial spells tend to reduce future incidence of nonemployment.
This might arise because of an increase in individual labor supply, for example due to lower
income. In addition, with a nite lifetime (or a nite follow-up period) the nonemployment
eect can also decline mechanically. This can arise since at a given, say, monthly probability
of being unemployed, individuals with longer initial spells accumulate less time in nonem-
ployment due to a shorter remaining lifetime. Despite these alternative hypotheses, little is
known about the longer-term eect of UI extensions on employment.
In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we use a regression discontinuity de-
sign to analyze the long-term eects of extensions in UI durations. These estimates dier
from standard estimates that they incorporate dierences in UI benet receipt and employ-
ment due to recurrent unemployment spells. Second, we extend the welfare formula of UI
extensions from SVB to incorporate recurrent nonemployment spells.
1 Welfare Formula with Long-Term Eects of UI Ex-
tensions
In this section we extend the welfare eect of UI extensions derived in SVB to incorporate
long-term eects of UI benet durations on nonemployment. The key dierence is that
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1instead of modeling the individual job seeker's choice of reservation wages, we generalize the
model to a choice of reservation match-quality, and hence of expected job duration.
Our model is closely based on SVB (2012), which in turn draws on Chetty (2008). As in
SVB, unemployed job seekers choose how intensely to search for a job, while receiving a xed
UI benet at a xed duration. In contrast to SVB and related papers, instead of receiving a
job at a given wage and accepting based on a reservation wage strategy, we assume workers
receive a job at a xed wage, but at a variable probability of layo that is drawn from
a stationary stochastic job oer distribution. In this case, we show that under common
assumptions job search behavior is described by a reservation layo probability. Jobs with
layo probabilities above the reservation values are accepted. As in the basic model, workers
face a liquidity constraint, and the policy maker chooses the duration of UI benets at a
constant level.
Our decision to model job search as a choice of a reservation layo probability rather than
a reservation wage can be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, wages may vary
little within a job class dened by occupation, industry, and previous job seniority; hence,
individuals have less of a choice over wages but look for jobs that provide a good t and
hence last longer. This is not a bad assumption in Germany, were wages in many jobs are
traditionally set by collective bargaining. On the other hand, one can interpret our model
more generally as a choice of reservation match quality, which may be related to multiple
possible job attributes, such as job duration, wages, commuting times, or work environment.
In this context, our approach provides a convenient short cut relative to explicitly considering
job search over multiple job attributes. It is also sensible because job duration is frequently
used as an index of job quality, given that wages can incorporate compensating dierentials
and hence do not fully represent a job's attractiveness.
After some algebra, which is summarized in our companion Web Appendix, the eect on









































t) are the expected marginal utilities at benet exhaustion
and upon reemployment, respectively; T, B, and D represent total remaining life time, total
benet duration, and total nonemployment duration; dB=dPj1 is the average exhaustion
rate, and dB=dPj2 is the eect of potential UI benet duration on duration of UI benet
receipt prior to benet exhaustion (such that the eect of a extension in UI duration on total
benet duration is dB=dP = dB=dPj1+dB=dPj2); and dD=dP is the corresponding eect on
total nonemployment duration. The formula has the same structure as that derived in SVB;
i.e., the welfare gain of UI extensions depends on the exhaustion rate, and is proportional
to the dierence in marginal utility of a worker exhausting UI benets relative to her utility
at reemployment. The welfare cost is the increase in taxes due to UI extensions, which
results from a rise in total payouts without corresponding welfare benets and a decline in
the number of individuals paying taxes.
2The key dierence with respect to the formula in SVB is that here B and D represent
total duration of UI benets and nonemployment after the start of the initial spell. I.e.,
they depend both on the duration of the initial UI and nonemployment spell, as well as
the incidence and duration of recurring UI and nonemployment spells. How this dierence
aects estimates of the eect of UI extensions is subject of our empirical analysis.
A noteworthy feature of the welfare equation we derived here is that any eect of UI
extensions on job durations or match quality other than what aects the incidence and
duration of UI and nonemployment spells does not aect welfare directly. As noted by Chetty
(2008), this results from an application of the envelope theorem. This welfare equation does
not take into account potentially important channels through which UI extension can aect
nonemployment and welfare, such as general equilibrium eects of UI extensions. Below, we
will nevertheless use the welfare equation to calibrate the welfare eects of UI extensions
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Figure 1: Days nonemployed per month
The dierence between the lines is estimated using a regression discontinuity design.
Vertical bars indicate statistical signicance.
2 Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Dynamic Ef-
fects of UI Extensions
In this section, we present regression discontinuity (RD) estimates using the same research
design as in SVB, with three dierences. First, our main outcome variables are the total
days receiving UI benets and the total days in nonemployment in the rst ve years after
the start of the initial UI spell, irrespective of whether the initial spell has ended or not.
Hence, in contrast to previous estimates this captures nonemployment eects from recurring
3spells. Second, we replicate the RD estimate for UI and nonemployment duration in each
month since the start of the initial spell, again irrespective of whether the initial spell has
ended. We use these estimates to construct dynamic gures capturing the long-term impact
of UI extensions. Finally, we provide preliminary estimates decomposing the eect on the
total nonemployment duration into a change in the incidence of nonemployment in any given
month after the initial spell has ended and a mechanical eect arising from a shorter remain-
ing time horizon over which individuals with higher potential UI durations can accumulate
time spent in nonemployment.
In Germany, after having worked at least 12 months to be covered, in the period from
1987 to 1999 unemployed workers were eligible to receive UI benets at a xed replacement
rate for a xed number of months (See SVB for details). The duration was a function of
exact age at application for benet receipt and the amount of labor force experience. Here,
we focus on the discontinuity at age 42 for workers that worked at least three out of the last
seven years without UI spell, for whom maximum duration of UI benets rose from 12 to
18 months. We focus on the earliest cuto point available to maximize our sample size and
follow up duration.
Table 1: The Eect of UI Benet Extensions on Long-term Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sum of days Sum of days UI Benet Nonemp.
on UI benets nonemployed Duration in Duration
over 5 years over 5 years 1st Nonemp spell until 1st job
D(Age42) 68.2 28.1 54.3 37.9
[1.28]** [4.07]** [1.10]** [4.27]**
dy
dP 11.4 4.68 9.15 6.32
[0.21]** [0.68]** [0.71]** [0.71]**
Observations 489275 489275 489275 489275
Mean of Dep. Var. 341.3 892.9 237.9 626.1
Coecients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (dierent slopes) on each side of
cuto. Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01)).
We implement a straightforward regression-based RD analysis using a two-year band-
width around the age cuto and allowing for a dierential linear impact of claiming age
on each side of the age cuto.1 We use administrative records from Germany covering the
period from 1975 to 2004, which provide us with information on exact day of birth, basic
demographic and job characteristics, as well as day-to-day UI and employment spells for the
universe of employees covered by social security. We extract individuals age 40 to 43 that
satisfy the labor force experience criterion who became unemployed between 1987 and 1999.
Our main outcome measures are days receiving UI benets and days in nonemployment at
any time within ve years after the start of the initial UI spell.
1In SVB, we discuss the possibility that workers might selectively apply for benet durations before and
after the age thresholds, and conclude that any impact of selection is likely to be small in our context.
Similarly, we examined the sensitivity of our estimates to modelling choices.
4Figure 1 displays the average number of days in nonemployment in each month after start
of benet receipt for the group of workers with 12 months and with 18 months UI duration.
The vertical bars represent RD estimates based on information on nonemployment duration
in the respective month for workers above and below the 42 age cuto. The structure
of the estimates is analogous to that of a classic event study and diers from standard
hazard functions, which only follows individuals until the exit from their rst unemployment
spell. The gure makes three points. First, nonemployment durations are higher for workers
eligible for higher benets even in the months before there is a dierence in eligibility. Hence,
workers appear to be forward looking in their labor supply choices. Second, there is a slightly
larger dierence in nonemployment 12 to 18 months after the start of the initial spell, when
eligibility for benets diers. Thus, an important part of the eect of UI extensions indeed
works through an extension of the rst spell, as captured by standard estimates. Finally,
the gure shows that the dierences in nonemployment last well beyond exhaustion at 18
months. Nonemployment is signicantly higher for workers with higher initial UI duration
up to ve years after the start of the initial spell. Although the dierences appear to have
essentially faded after ve years, they are economically signicant at least up to three years
after the initial start of unemployment.
Table 2: Decomposing the Long-term Employment Eects of UI Extensions
(1) (2)
Prob of unemp Covariance bw








Mean of Dep. Var. 0.18 -49.4
Coecients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (dierent slopes) on each side of
cuto. Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01)).
Figure 1 represents the combined eect from the initial nonemployment spell and dier-
ences in the incidence and duration of additional nonemployment spells. To show directly
how dierentiating between the rst and additional spells makes a dierence, in Table 1 we
present various estimates of the eect of UI extensions on the sum of days spent receiving UI
benets and in nonemployment over ve years after the initial spell. When we incorporate
all nonemployment spells into our estimate, an extension of six months in potential durations
of UI benets leads to an increase in 28.1 days in nonemployment (column 2). To gauge the
dierence that accounting for recurring UI and nonemployment spells does, in column 4 of
Table 1 we show the corresponding result when we only measure the eect of UI extensions
on the duration of the initial UI and nonemployment spell.2 At an increase of 37.9 days for a
2Note that these estimates are expressed in days and show the eect for ve years. The estimates in
5six month UI extension, this estimate is substantially larger than the estimate in column 2.
This implies that allowing for added nonemployment spells lowers the eect of UI extensions
on days of nonemployment by about 10 days, a decline of about 26% relative to the standard
estimate. Note that in contrast to this reduction, comparing column 1 and 3 of Table 1,
the sum of days receiving UI benets increases if we include additional spells. This is partly
mechanical, since the German UI system allows individuals nding a job before exhaustion of
UI benets to carry over their remaining benet duration to the next spell. This carry-over
eect is larger for those with higher UI durations, a nding that we discuss further when
considering welfare eects of UI extensions in Section III.
To better understand the sources of the substantial decline in the eect of UI extensions
on nonemployment durations due to incorporation of recurring spells we nd, consider the
following decomposition. Let D1 be the duration of the rst nonemployment spell. Let pu
be the probability of being nonemployed in a given month after the rst nonemployment
spell (this is a combination of the probability of being laid o again the the duration of
the later unemployment spells). Then the total amount spent in nonemployment (until
retirement or the 5 year horizon we consider here) of a given individual i can be expressed
as Di = Di1 + (T   Di1)piu. To obtain a marginal eect of UI extensions on D for the
population, take expectations of this expression and dierentiate both sides with respect to
potential UI duration P. This yields an expression for the dierence between the the eect












The dierence arises from three sources. First, at a given propensity to spent time in
nonemployment pu, a rise in the duration of the rst spell reduces the total time spent
in nonemployment in the remaining period (call this the 'mechanical' eect). Second, the
propensity of nonemployment in any given month may change; as mentioned at the outset,
the sign of this eect is ambiguous. Third, the covariance between the duration of the rst
spell and the propensity to become nonemployed in the population may either rise or fall.
The fact that the results in Table 1 indicate that the dierence is negative, the decomposition
suggests that either the 'mechanical' eects dominates the two other components, or that
it is reinforced by a decline in the propensity to become unemployed (or a change in the
covariance term).
To learn more about the three sources of the dierence between the standard and more
inclusive estimates of the nonemployment eect of UI durations, we calculated the eect of
UI extensions on the monthly propensity to become nonemployed (pu) and its covariance
with the duration of the initial spell. These results are shown in Table 2. The mean of pu
is 0.18, and the covariance term is negative, suggesting that those individuals with longer
initial spells have a lower subsequent probability to be nonemployed. The ndings of the
eect of UI extensions are quite striking. The propensity of being nonemployed declines for
individuals with higher potential UI durations. To assess the magnitude of this eect, one
has to multiply the change with (T   D1), the number of days outstanding in our ve year
SVB, Table 2 are expressed in months and show the eect over three years. To express the results in terms
of months, divide the estimates in Table 1 by 30.5.
6window after the initial spell; the result suggests that the decline in pu contributes with a
decline in 5.5 to the dierences in the estimates in columns 2 and 3 in Table 1. I.e., a bit
more than half of the decline in the nonemployment eect of UI extensions when we consider
all spells instead of just the rst nonemployment spell is due to a decline in the propensity
to be unemployed. The mechanical eect and a further decline in the covariance explain
each about half of the remaining dierence.
The increase in the eect of UI extensions on UI benet receipt and nonemployment
durations may be due to a decline in the number of recurring nonemployment spells, as well
as an reduction in the duration of such spells. A preliminary examination of this question
suggested that the duration of future nonemployment spells is unaected by UI extensions
and that instead the incidence of new nonemployment spells declined slightly. Pursuing this
decomposition is a useful goal for future work.
3 Discussion and Conclusion
We can use the modied welfare formula we derived to gauge the potential magnitude of
positive and negative welfare changes due to the presence of persistent eects of UI exten-
sions. As discussed in more detail in SVB, these results should be treated as illustrative and
approximate rather than exact. To implement the welfare formula, we expressed it in terms
of sucient statistics (see our Web Appendix) and rescaled it by the marginal utility of the
employed, so that welfare is expressed in monetary terms rather than utility. We require
two additional inputs with respect to the results of the paper. First, we need an estimate
of the ratio of income and substitution eects, which we take from Chetty (2008). Second,
to implement the welfare formula we need to obtain estimates of dB=dPj1 and dB=dPj2.
However, we can use the fact that UI extensions do not increase the duration of additional
spells to infer that the added time spent on UI due to a reduction in search (dB=dPj2) for
the added spells is zero. Hence, all of the portion of dB=dP beyond the dB=dPj2 for the
initial spell must be due to an increase in coverage and hence is welfare increasing.
Using these assumptions and the estimates for the benet and nonemployment eect of
UI extensions in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1, we obtain that the welfare gain from UI
extensions is 281 Euros per month of UI extension and per unemployed worker. If instead
we use the estimates of the eect of UI extensions on the rst spell in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 1, the welfare gain is 192 Euro per month of UI extension. Given the increase in
outlays in the former case, the dierence in the welfare gain per Euro spent is smaller, 0.97 vs.
0.83, but still substantial in percentage terms. These numbers highlight that incorporating
persistent eects of UI extensions on nonemployment durations can substantially change
the welfare eect of UI extensions. The magnitude of the welfare gain depends crucially
on how we decompose the total benet increase into the exhaustion rate (dB=dPj1) and
the component due to reduction in search eort (dB=dPj2). The reason is that dB=dPj1
is weighted by the ratio (here a value of 1.5) and dB=dPj2 enters the welfare equation as
it is. On the other hand, the nonemployment eect, which has been the focus of a large
literature, is multiplied by the unemployment rate (B=(T   D)) and hence changes in its
value have rather small impact in the welfare formula we derived. While when only looking
over a single spell we have that dD=dP is roughly proportional to dB=dPj2 and is thus a
7reasonable statistic to approximate the costs of UI extensions, in the recurring spell case the
relationship is more complex and care has to be taken to estimate the dierent components
accurately.
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